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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are being employed 
throughout the DoD/DoN. In the Government sector, such systems have been recognized 
by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security as a serious concern in  efforts to 
protect the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure.  DoN Vulnerability Assessment teams have 
acknowledged a need to include SCADA systems as part of their facility assessment 
process.  This effort is in its infancy and a more thorough understanding of the threats 
and vulnerabilities that SCADA systems expose the DoD/DoN to and what can be done 
to mitigate them is needed. 
This work identifies the common components make up a SCADA system and the 
information security vulnerabilities that exist within these systems.  Current industry and 
Government documents in this area of research will be reviewed and analyzed as part of 
this study. Using this information,  a preliminary checklist for vulnerability assessment of 
DoN SCADA systems was created.   An assessment of an operational SCADA  system  
was conducted. This permitted validation and revision of the preliminary checklist.   
 
B. THESIS SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
This research was to result in the development of a preliminary checklist for 
vulnerability assessment of DoN SCADA systems to be used by DoN Vulnerability 
Assessment Teams.  As part of the research, a SCADA demonstration system was built.  
That system and an existing commercial SCADA system that is representative of the 
systems that the DoN is dependent upon was used to validate the checklist. 
The thesis chapters are organized as follows: 
Chapter I - Introduction  – This chapter introduces SCADA systems and their 
importance and  explains the motivation behind this work 
Chapter II - Background – This chapter provides   background material that 
motivates the research.  Additionally it provides examples of where SCADA systems can 
be found and why they are of interest to the DoN. 
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Chapter III – Vulnerability Assessments – This chapter discusses the rationale for 
the preliminary checklist, explains what a vulnerability assessment seeks to accomplish 
and lists some to the items to be covered in an assessment.  
Chapter IV – Developing and Validating a Vulnerability Assessment for SCADA 
Systems Test Plan – This chapter describes the case study conducted to develop and 
validate the preliminary checklist. 
Chapter V - Recommendations and Conclusions – This chapter summarizes the 




Process or Industrial Control Systems (PCS/ICS) have been in use since the 1960s 
and are often broadly categorized as  Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.  DCS are used to control large, 
complex processes but typically at a single site.  SCADA systems are used to control 
more dispersed assets, hence there is increased concern about their cyber security, 
especially where centralized data acquisition is as important as control.  Presidential 
Decision Directive 63 considers these as critical infrastructure components and a SCADA 
system under the control of an adversary could wreak national havoc.  The Department of 
Homeland Security recently recognized the need to protect against the vulnerabilities that 
exist in SCADA systems by funding 11 small business research grants that deal with 
developing technologies that will help to secure these systems. [DHS]  
SCADA systems are employed throughout industry and are used to monitor and 
control processes and functions that affect our nation’s critical infrastructure.  The 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States as a whole is very reliant upon and 
is a major consumer of the products and services that are managed by SCADA systems.  
Some of these industries are the electric, oil, gas, chemical manufacturing, transportation, 
and waste water.    
 
A. SCADA COMPONENTS 
Figure 1 shows the components of a SCADA system.  Theses components are:  
the controller, sensors, actuators (or final control elements),a human machine interface 
(HMI) and a remote diagnostics and maintenance capability [SPP]. 




















Figure 1.   Generic Industrial Control System (ICS) (From Ref. SPP).  
 
A SCADA system is an industrial measurement and control system consisting of a 
master station, one or more field data gathering and control units or remote terminal units 
(RTUs).  They execute a collection of open and/or proprietary software and are used to 
monitor and control remotely located field data elements.   
SCADA systems hardware can be broken down into the following five major 
categories; each with its own set of security associated risks.  These layers are: 
• Field level instrumentation and control devices 
• Marshalling terminals and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) 
• Communications system 
• Master station(s) 




Figure 2.   Generic SCADA system architecture.  (From Ref. PCSRF) 
 
The RTUs interface with remotely located field analog and digital sensors.  The 
communications system provides a path for communication between the remote sites and 
the master station which may be in close proximity to each other or many miles apart.  
The master station gathers data from the RTUs and provides for an operator interface for 
the control of the remote sites and the display of information. [SCADA] 
SCADA software can be either proprietary or open.  Proprietary software is 
written by a company to only communicate with its hardware.  Open software is 
becoming more attractive to consumers because it offers interoperability which enables 
users to mix components from different manufacturers  within  the same SCADA system.  
This severs the reliance on a single manufacturer.    This open architecture also allows 
companies to replace specialized control devices and communications elements with 
general purpose computer equipment and communications technology.  While very 
popular, this has contributed significantly to the cyber security threat.  Of note, many 
SCADA master stations  are implemented as Microsoft Windows applications. [DHS] 
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B. NETWORKS 
SCADA system or process control system networks were initially designed to 
operate as isolated networks and therefore security design was neglected 
[MCDONNELL].  However, the economic realities  have driven much of the SCADA 
system communications toward less expensive solutions based on the used of shared 
networks, such as the Internet or other IP networks. The trend to connect SCADA 
systems to corporate intranets for visibility and maintenance has created a backdoor for 
would-be cyber terrorists.  Once highly proprietary, SCADA systems are currently being 
fielded using COTS technologies that rely on public Internet protocols for cost savings 
and management ease. [CW Hong Kong] A typical network architecture might look like 
the one in Figure 3 below. 
Nearly all new sensor/actuator devices (generally called Intelligent Electronic 
Devices or IEDs) have a web interface that can be used for operating software upgrades 
and maintenance. The industries using SCADA systems have  incorrectly assumed that 
the firewalls and the latest available network equipment provide adequate protection for 
the isolation of SCADA systems and corporate intranets from the Internet [OMNIV].   
 
 
Figure 3.   SCADA Communications Migration to IP Networks (From Ref. (OMNIV) ) 
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C. SCADA ATTACK EXAMPLES 
A large number of security events and attacks, both in the past and more recently, 
have helped to increase general  awareness of the security weaknesses of SCADA 
systems.  The attacks listed below, with the exception of the last two  are  directly linked 
to the fact that there exists a path from the SCADA system network to the Internet.  The 
list below is of noteworthy attacks.  In reality, there were many more.  
• On February 7, 2002, a vulnerability in a data transmission was discovered 
that was briefed to the President.  The security flaw, according to the FBI, 
could have been exploited to bring down telephone networks and halt 
control information exchanged between ground and aircraft flight control 
systems.  [WASHPT] 
• SCADA devices are a global technology and it is understood that our 
enemies have access to and an in-depth understanding of the technology.  
Al Qaeda computers contained information about SCADA devices and 
how to hack them.  After gleaning information from the contents of 
computers captured in Afghanistan and through prisoner interrogations, 
the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that the Al Qaeda cyber threat 
is critical. [Blackout] 
• North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) files suggest that a 
cyber attack dry run took place in January 2003.   The attack affected two 
unnamed utilities and their ability to execute bulk electric system control 
from their primary control centers for a few hours. [Blackout] 
• The Maroochy Shire wastewater system had been leaking hundreds of 
thousands of gallons of wastewater sludge into parks, rivers, and the 
manicured grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel for two months. On April 23, 
2000, police stopped a car on the road to Deception Bay and found a 
stolen computer and radio transmitter.  Using easily acquired technology, 
Vitek Boden had turned his vehicle into a command center for sewage 
treatment along Australia's Sunshine Coast.  The arrest occurred while he 
was engaging in his 46th successful intrusion. [WASHPT] 
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• In 1998, a 12 year old broke into the computer system that runs Arizona’s 
Roosevelt Dam.  Federal authorities said he had complete command of the 
SCADA system controlling the dam’s massive floodgates that hold back 
as much as 489 trillion gallons.  That much water could theoretically cover 
the city of Phoenix, which is down river, to a height of five feet.  
[WASHPT] 
• "Red Teams" of mock intruders from the Energy Department's four 
national laboratories have devised eight scenarios for SCADA attack on an 
electrical power grid.  During exercises, these scenarios have been tested a 
total of eighteen times with complete success against large regional 
utilities companies.  Systems that are almost identical run oil and gas 
utilities and many manufacturing plants. [WASHPT] 
• During the KEMA Cyber Security Conference a presentation was given by 
an unidentified utility company of a 2 year-old targeted attack of the 
utility's real-time SCADA system.  The critical elements of the attack 
were:  1.) The utility and the vendor each assumed the other was securing 
their part of the system - but neither took adequate steps to ensure 
protection. 2.) The vulnerable system that provided the path for 
penetration of the SCADA system was originally designed to have 
minimal use and exposure to the Internet - instead it actually had 
significant operating time.  3.)  The attack resulted in significant financial 
impact to the utility even though they did not lose electric power and their 
customers were not physically affected.  4.) The utility lost use of its 
SCADA system for 2 weeks until the SCADA system could be completely 
reprogrammed and made a "trusted" system.  5.)  The cost was 4 man-
months of effort.   6.)  As with others, the utility did not report the incident 
- there was no requirement to do so since no electric power was lost. 
[WEISS] 
• A European utility reported at a recent CIGRE meeting that a virus 
attacked their Distribution SCADA system, and this resulted in partial 
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unavailability of the system functions.  The utility reported they lost 
complete view of numerous distribution substations by the operators in the 
control center.  Approximately 40 man-weeks (over a 4 calendar-week 
period) were required to mitigate the problem.  This event was never 
reported. Additionally, the Chief Engineer for a very large Asian utility 
provided details of 3 cyber attacks on their critical electric facilities. 
[WEISS]  
• In Bellingham, Washington in June 1999, a SCADA database 
modification was made that caused an extreme system slowdown of the 
system that controlled a gasoline pipeline.  A pressure surge, which could 
have been handled if not for the system slowdown caused the pipe to 
rupture releasing 237K gallons of gasoline and killing three  people. 
[NTSB] 
•  Based upon a report citing advances in Soviet technology through 
purchasing and copying U.S. technology, President Nixon placed 
restrictions on the export of computers and software to the Soviet Union.   
The K.G.B. responded to the restrictions by stealing or buying the 
technology through third parties.  The C.I.A. found out about this in what 
French intelligence referred to as the Farewell dossier.  Rather than 
deporting Soviet spies, Gus Weiss proposed a complex scheme to 
deliberately provide the Soviet with flawed technology.  Through 
Farewell, the C.I.A. learned that one of  their main priorities was to 
procure control system software to run their new gas pipeline.  A dormant 
malicious program, commonly referred to as a “Trojan horse” was added 
to the software that ran the pumps, turbines, and valves of the pipeline (a 
SCADA system).  The result of this was the largest non-nuclear explosion 
ever witnessed from space that happened in June 1982.  This caused 
apprehensive Soviet scientists to delay or abandon all work that was based 
upon the software the K.G.B. had stolen for years.  [SAFIRE] 
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The last two attack examples are particularly insidious since they were conducted 
by insiders. 
 
D. CURRENT NATIONAL SCADA SECURITY POSTURE 
President Clinton started the federal critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
initiative in May 1998 with Presidential Decision Directive 63.  That directive required 
agencies to protect the information systems that support the nation's infrastructure. 
However, reports from the General Accounting Office showed uneven progress in 
complying with PDD 63.  Very few agencies met the 2003 deadline that it outlined. 
[PDD63]  On December 17, 2003, President Bush signed a directive titled "Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-7" that replaces PDD 63.  It mandates that by July 
2004, the heads of all Federal departments and agencies shall develop and submit to the 
Director of the OMB plans for protecting the physical and cyber critical infrastructure 
and key resources that they own.[HSPD7]    
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Laboratory’s mission 
is to conduct research that improves the nation’s technology infrastructure.  NIST also 
manages a Critical Infrastructure Grants program that funds research to provide solutions 
for the IT security problems of our nation’s critical infrastructures.  Through the NIST 
initiative on CIP, the Process Control Security Requirements Forum is supporting the 
development and dissemination of standards for process control and SCADA security.  
PCSRF is applying the ISO 15408 Common Criteria methodology to develop Protection 
Profiles for process control.  Current work includes the creation of a Protection Profile 
for Industrial Control systems and the group is currently discussing the development of a 
SCADA protection profile [PCSRF]. 
The following is referenced from a statement given to Congress in March 2004 by 
Ben Wu, Deputy Under Secretary Technology Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce.  In his testimony, Mr. Wu stated that the security of SCADA and building 
control systems could be enhanced.  Delayed due to funding constraints, he is seeking an 
increase in FY 2005 funding (NIST funding increase from 10M to 16M) to help develop 
test procedures and guidelines for retrofitted cryptographic modules for SCADA systems 
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and to validate standards for SCADA and other ICS security.  This aforementioned is 
necessary for NIST to fulfill one of its general responsibilities assigned under  the Federal 
Information Security Management Act of 2002, which was to conduct research to 
identify information security vulnerabilities and to develop techniques to provide cost-
effective security [TESTIM].  
One of the program goals outlined by NIST relative to CIP is to increase the 
security of computer systems that control production and distribution in critical 
infrastructure industries.  NIST plans to have this done by 2007. Working with the 
Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF), NIST is defining security 
requirement for products used in SCADA systems in hopes of influencing vendors to 
meet those requirements [NISTCIP].   
 
E. CURRENT DOD SCADA IMPLEMENTATIONS 
DoD  is reliant upon SCADA systems as illustrated in the following examples. 
United States Navy.   SCADA systems are used on the Navy Mine Counter 
Measure ships to provide control and monitoring of various shipboard systems to include 
propulsion, lube oil, fuel oil, and firemain. [MCM]    The Navy shipboard automation 
project undertaken jointly by Rockwell Automation and the Office of Naval Research 
seeks to implement Industrial Control Systems using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
hardware and intelligent software to manage ship engineering plants. [Rockwell]  At the 
United States Navy shipyard at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the Navy awarded a contract to 
Transdyn for a  Power Distribution/Substation monitoring and control SCADA system. 
[TRANSDYN]   
United States Army.  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and ARINC Incorporated 
have teamed to provide advanced monitoring and control of electric power generation 
systems.  ARINC SCADA systems use COTS software and hardware and open industry 
standards for low cost and high flexibility . [ARINC] 
United States Air Force.  Designated as a showcase facility, Edwards Air Force 
Base has an administration facility that uses a SCADA system to control the heating, 
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ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems of numerous facilities. 
[DODENERGY] 
All of the above either are connected to the Internet or have to capacity to be so 
connected.   The secure operation of these systems is imperative. 
 
F. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY’S CIP PROGRAM (DON CIP) 
The DoN CIP program is an enterprise-wide partnership of organizational entities 
that are essential for DoN to achieve effective protection of critical infrastructures.  
Working closely with regional infrastructures in Naval concentration area, the DON CIP 
leverages efforts of DOD to develop integrated physical/cyber and on/off-base 
infrastructure protection strategies for physical and cyber components both on and off 
base.  This is being done to enhance the protection of DOD/DON mission essential 
infrastructures. [DONCIP]. 
A key element of the DoN’s CIP Program strategy is the Naval Integrated 
Vulnerability Assessment (NIVA) process.  This process is used to identify and evaluate 
critical vulnerabilities and single points of failure by helping to protect mission critical 
cyber and physical mission essential infrastructures.   The NIVA process is supported by 
four assessments pillars that cover the areas of Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection, 
Commercial Dependencies, Computer Network Defense (CND), and Consequence 
Management.   
Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection addresses the  vulnerability to a deliberate 
physical attack or  the effects of an accident or a natural disaster on a critical 
infrastructure.  The Commercial Dependencies portion of the NIVA process assesses the 
reliability and robustness of commercially supplied services (electricity, water, etc.) that 
are required to perform those mission essential functions necessary to execute the 
warfighting mission.  The CND component examines the ability of an asset to withstand 
a cyber attack.  The final pillar of the NIVA process, Consequence Management, tests the 
viability and integration of four plans that were deemed necessary should an attack 
against a mission critical asset occur. Theses four plans are: Continuity of Operations, 
Disaster Recovery, Response, and Reconstitution [CIPIMI]. 
  The NIVA process also makes use of the CIP Event Cycle shown in the Figure 4 
below.  The six phases of the CIP cycle covers activities that could occur before during 
and after an event that could result in infrastructure destruction or disruption. As shown, 
the CIP Event Cycle is broadly broken up into two Modules.  Module One constitutes 
activities that can take place prior to an event whereas Module Two contains the actions 




Figure 4.   CIP Event Cycle. (From Ref. NIVA) 
 
The Analysis/Assessment phase of Module One calls for the identification and 
development of a prioritized list of mission critical assets.  This is followed by an 
assessment of those critical assets to find potential vulnerabilities and single points of 
failure that would disrupt the military’s mission  if they were exploited. The Vulnerability 
Remediation phase is next.  This is the process of taking precautionary measures to 
improve the reliability, availability, and survivability of those assets identified during the 
Analysis/Assessment phase.  Remediation normally occurs after vulnerabilities and single 
points of failure have been identified. [NIVA]   
As stated earlier, the NIVA process is also concerned with Commercial 
Dependency assessment which seeks to identify critical dependencies on commercial 
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utilities.  Like most other entities, the DoN is dependent on both organic assets i.e., a 
communications site and nonorganic assets such as the electric power and 
telecommunications utilities needed to support the asset.  Electric power and 
telecommunications facilities make extensive use of SCADA systems.  It is worth noting 
that the NIVA process does not seek to perform vulnerability assessments on SCADA 
assets belonging to nonorganic commercial  entities. 
 
G. DITSCAP PROGRAM 
The Department of Defense Information Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) is the standardized approach designed to guide DoD 
agencies through the certification and accreditation (C & A) process.  The C & A process 
exists to protect and secure entities that make up the Defense Information Infrastructure.  
There are four phases to the DITSCAP process. The phases are definition, verification, 
validation, and post-accreditation. During the definition phase, all system requirements 
and capabilities are documented to include mission, function, and interfaces. The 
resulting deliverable is a preliminary System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA). 
In the verification phase, recommended changes to a system are performed and the 
resulting deliverable is a refined SSAA. The validation phase proceeds with a review of 
the SSAA. Vulnerability and penetration tests are also performed and the deliverable is a 
certification package containing the final SSAA and an approval or disapproval to 
operate. [DITSCAP] 
Referring back to the Navy example of the SCADA system used on the Navy 
Mine Counter Measure ships it is expected that these systems would have been certified 
and accredited via the DITSCAP.  A search for SSAAs of SCADA systems was 
conducted.  My research has not produced a single SSAA, thus far, for DoN SCADA 
systems although such systems are widely used on Navy vessels.  Points of contact in the 
Navy Information Assurance community have stated that the systems were considered 
closed-loop and therefore did not need to go through the C & A  process.  Industry trends 
and the quest of military members for ease of maintenance suggest that these systems will 
become more “open” or accessible and therefore this decision should be reconsidered.  
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The initial vulnerability assessment checklist produced by this study could be used in the  
C & A process as it would be implemented for SCADA systems.  
 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter gave an overview of SCADA systems, what they are used for and 
where they are located.  Examples of attacks on SCADA systems were presented.  These 
illustrate how highly vulnerable SCADA systems are today.  It also pointed out some of 
the SCADA system usage in the DoN/DoD, most importantly, their use aboard Navy 
vessels.  It also introduced the NIVA process that the DoN uses to ascertain the 
vulnerabilities to its critical infrastructures that may could prevent the accomplishment of 
its mission.  A short overview of the DITSCAP process and the possible application of 





















 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
17 
III. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
This section will give the reader background on vulnerability assessments by 
defining vulnerability assessment, discussing attack vectors, and providing some of the 
technical and procedural items to assess.  Some threats and vulnerabilities of SCADA 
systems will also be presented.   
 
A. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
A vulnerability assessment is the systematic examination of a critical 
infrastructure, the interconnected systems on which it relies, its information, or product to 
determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, evaluate 
security alternatives, and verify the adequacy of such measures after implementation. 
[CIAO]  In an assessment, the assessor should have the full cooperation of the 
organization being assessed. The organization should grant access to its facilities, 
provides network access, outlines detailed information about the network, etc. All parties 
acknowledge that the goal is to study security and identify improvements to secure the 
systems.   
Vulnerability assessments provide a "snapshot in time" assessment of a system's 
or network's security posture  As such, even when identified vulnerabilities are fixed or 
patched, future changes in configurations or permissions could open up entirely new 
holes. Additionally, new vulnerabilities in operating systems and applications crop up all 
the time.  This means that, just because a particular system is patched and ‘secure’ today, 
the system may be deemed insecure when new vulnerabilities are discovered.  Follow-up 
assessments will determine if old vulnerabilities have been fixed and can identify new 
ones that need to be addressed.[WINKLER] 
 
B. ATTACK VECTORS 
When putting together a ‘checklist’ for use when doing SCADA system 
vulnerability assessments, one should look at the three possible attack vectors.  Refer to 
Figure 5.  These are: 
18 
• Internet.  The Internet poses a great danger because one has no control 
over it.  Connecting your SCADA system network to the Internet for 
centralized operation and remote maintenance over public networks opens 
the door for tampering.  While the trend is to allow such connections even 
down to the sensor/IED level, connecting components directly to the 
Internet allow for simplified invasion of your SCADA network. 
• Corporate Network.  The model for most control system networks is as 
shown in Figure 5 with no direct connection to the Internet.  This model 
relies upon firewalls to protect it from cyber attack.  
• Communications Path or Control System LAN (internal to the control 
system network.  Also depicted in Figure 5 is the control system LAN as 
shown with the line around it.  Legacy control system networks were 
totally separate from the corporate network and the Internet.  That is 
usually not the case today with control system network.  Also the 
movement within the process control arena toward open standards, mostly 
IP based, if an adversary can gain access to the control system LAN then 
the adversary has access every device on the network. 
 
Figure 5.    Current Cyber Assessment Model. (From Ref INEEL) Currently, the approach of 
cyber testing is to exploit IP data streams. IP includes the Internet, Intranet and 
control system LAN 
 
Threats can be broadly broken down into two categories that need to be 
addressed: insider and outsider threats.  Insiders include authorized users both inside and 
outside of the control system LAN and can include technicians, operators, and company 
staff.  Threats from this group may or may not be intentional.  The  absence of security 
training and a good security policy should also be considered as an insider threat.  In 
assessing the outsider threat, one should look at external communications paths, vendor 
support access, IP based communications utilizing private or public communications 
networks, web services, and operating system and hardware standardization.  
[NAGALA].  When using current low assurance commodity products, one can generally 
assume that the easier it is to manage the network, the easier it is for an adversary to 
attack it. 
The Department of Energy, the Chemical Industry Data Exchange, and the Sandia 
National Laboratories have all published guidance or lessons learned from their 
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experience in assessing the cyber security of control systems.  Each agency sited 
significant security issues with each SCADA system they assessed.  Trends such as 
moving toward the full automation and networking of the systems and reliance on IP 
compounds the security issues.  A thorough review of these documents provided the basis 
for the creation of the vulnerability assessment checklist. 
 
C. TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL ITEMS TO ASSESS 
1. System Data 
Data is the fundamental element in any information architecture.  Identification 
and classification of control system data into categories of similar sensitivity should be 
established.  Without this distinction, it is impossible to determine where to apply 
security precautions to communications links, databases, etc. [INEEL] 
A forensic flaw found in most control systems is the absence of capability to 
easily analyze data to determine if intrusions have occurred.  Very few of the SCADA 
devices in today’s market have the capability to examine control system traffic and 
determine if the traffic is legitimate or unauthorized.  (Note: The capability does exist in 
some equipment that would allow you to determine if the traffic is the proper format and, 
to some extent, if the data is correct from a protocol standpoint. However, there are no 
devices that would allow you to analyze and determine if the traffic is correct for “that 
timeframe/conditions of the grid”).  [PETERS] 
 
2. Security Administration 
SCADA systems should have security administration policies to aid in the 
implementation, operation, and maintenance of a secure system.  Security procedures 
should include implementation guides,  security plans, and security enforcement that 
include the use of auditing.  Other important aspects of security administration are 
configuration management and security training of the staff and are necessary 




The architecture of the SCADA system should be reviewed to identify single 
points of failure.  Whether or not the SCADA system is being leveraged to convey 
emergency signals such as security and fire alarms should be looked at as well since this 
can possibly introduce a backdoor into the system. [INEEL]  Many control systems 
currently operate on low bandwidth communication paths.  Dual use of these paths or 
unauthorized traffic on these paths (e.g., via worm, or non-prioritized download) may 
lead to loss of control of the affected devices.  In some instances a loss of control may be 
as bad as compromise of the control device). [PETERS] 
The architecture should avoid the use of inappropriate wireless communications. 
A lack of authentication in the 802.11 series of wireless communication protocols and an 
unfixable fundamental flaw that allows a Denial Of Service make the 802.11 series of 
protocols unsuitable for control system communications.  A lack of 
authentication/security in other wireless communication mechanisms increases the risk of 
an adversary gaining access to the communication channel.  The use of unsecured 
wireless communication for control networks should be avoided if possible. [PETERS] 
  
4. Networks 
Process control networks should be assessed to determine associated 
vulnerabilities.  Legacy systems provide almost no inherent security and their network 
configuration warrants attention.  Configuration passwords should be made as difficult to 
crack as possible.  Wireless links are largely unprotected as they are usually broadcasts 
and of considerable length.  Connections between the SCADA network and external 
networks can pose significant risk as well since they often consider the outside network 
as trusted. [INEEL] 
Additionally poorly designed SCADA Control Networks that 1) fail to 
compartmentalize communication with the corporate network and other entities outside 
of the Control System;  2) fail to employ sufficient “defense in depth” mechanisms;  3) 
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fail to restrict “trusted access” to the control network; and 4) excessively rely on “security 
through obscurity” as a defensive mechanism. [PETERS] 
The use of non-deterministic communications for command and control (in 
particular) Internet based SCADA constitutes another vulnerability.  With non-
deterministic  communication you can not guarantee delivery and/or the path taken by the 
communications. This increases the risk of critical control system communications 
failure.  The use of the Internet increases that risk of denial of service  as it is a very 
adversary-friendly environment and attacks against other entities could greatly impact 
any control communications that uses this path or share resources that touch the Internet.  
Research has shown that a  limited use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) exists in 
control systems due to key management and other maintenance issues.  One of the 
concerns is that an incorrectly configured VPN or one in which the operator forgets how 
to properly operate could cause a Denial of Service to the affected device.  [PETERS]  
 
5. Platforms 
The computer platforms in SCADA networks fall broadly into two categories; 
proprietary or nonproprietary.   Proprietary devices often have weak password control 
that can be defeated locally.  Password access usually grants one complete control of the 
device.  They often have a lack of defensive mechanisms to restrict 
administrative/maintenance access to control system components and have insufficient 
controls to protect against the installation of unauthorized software. [PETERS]  
Additionally, most devices offer the capability for remote access and configuration which 
greatly increases the need for physical protection.  SCADA applications, interfaces, and 
databases are moving away from proprietary platforms to computers running Windows or 
UNIX operating systems.  Default configuration of these platforms adds additional 
vulnerabilities. [INEEL] 
Many control systems have not been developed to avoid standard Information 
Technology (IT) problems e.g., lack of boundary checks (i.e.: control signal or data input 
is outside reasonable numerical bounds) in control systems could lead to “buffer 
overflow” attacks against the control system software itself.  This forms an additional 
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avenue of attack beyond the ones available due to the control system being run on a 
commercial operating system.   SCADA communication protocols were never designed 
with security in mind and therefore the protocols themselves typically lack any form of 
authentication.  If an adversary can gain access to the appropriate communication 
channel, the control system devices will accept any command given in that protocol. 
[PETERS]  
Another problem is the lack of understanding of proper control system 
configurations including configurations of embedded system devices.  This lack of 
understanding can contribute to the misconfiguration of operating parameters.  Often 
delays occur in the implementation of software and firmware patches due to concerns of 
unintended effects on operations.  An example of this is Service Pack 2 for Windows XP.  
This requires extensive testing of patches prior to implementation and may result in 
patches not being applied due to these “unintended” effects. [PETERS] 
 
D. POSSIBLE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
1. Chemical Industry Data Exchange  
The Chemical Industry Data Exchange published a list of some possible cyber 
security system vulnerabilities: [CIDX]  Below is a partial list of items from that source 
that should be considered when performing a vulnerability assessment. 
• Information technology product flaws requiring “fixes” after initial 
product installation 
• Configuration and usage deficiencies of cyber security-technology 
products, such as retaining default system-supplied user ids and passwords 
• Deficient cyber security processes (such as change management for IT or 
Process Control, and personnel processes such as identification revocation 
upon termination of system access) 
• Lack of cyber security user training, for employees and contractors 
• Lack of user awareness and adherence to sound security procedures (e.g., 
leaving your computer running unattended) 
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• Inadequately classified or protected electronic information that could be 
used to facilitate cyber security attacks 
• Rogue access points, such as unmanaged modem access or Internet 
browser maintenance “back doors” 
• Insufficient technology (for example, not installing a firewall) 
• Use of remote access software (e.g., pcAnywhere®, Timbuktu®) programs 
that are typically used for access by experts within or outside the entity to 
support systems or operations. These applications can provide significant 
control and configuration access to an unauthorized individual. 
One vendor web site even gives potential adversaries footprinting 
information by providing the model number of the equipment and the protocols used in a 
typical  shipboard applications.  [ROCK] 
 
2. Internet Protocol (IP) Vulnerabilities 
IP Networks, including the Internet, were designed to provide robust, ubiquitous 
any-to-any connectivity for the Wide Area Networks (WANs) used by the Nation’s data 
network infrastructure. Such networks have four common architectural characteristics 
that make them unsuitable for SCADA system communications. IP Networks are: 
• Connectionless – each packet contains sufficient information about the 
source and destination to route packets from any source to any destination 
without requiring a specific connection or route. 
• Stateless – the control nodes in the network (routers) are not aware in a 
timely manner of the state of the network at any given time. The network 
will recover from events that change its state, but the time constants 
involved are orders of magnitude longer than the duration of those events. 
• In-band Control – the signaling and control protocol traffic shares the 
same IP links as the bearer traffic. Users of the network have access to and 
can introduce these control packets as valid user traffic.   
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• Autonomous, distributed Control – Each control node (router) is 
independent (a peer) of all other nodes. No integrated, end-to-end control 
is possible [OMNIV]. 
 
3. 802.11 Vulnerabilities 
 Customers have been asking substation IED vendors to incorporate an 802.11 
(Wi-Fi) interface into substation IEDs despite many studies reporting security problems 
[WIFI].  The Medium Access Control layer of the 802.11 protocol, in all its various 
releases, e.g.: 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g, is based on the exchange of request/response 
messages.  Each request sent by a station in the network triggers a corresponding 
response on its counterpart.  Wireless networks rely on an access point (AP) or a set of 
them as a central node through which every communication is routed.  The management 
frames of the 802.11 protocol sent to an AP triggers an elaboration of request-response 
messages with consequent consumption of computational resources.  
To scheme used to cause a denial of service is quite simple: each request message sent by 
a station must be responded with a response message sent by the AP.   Thus, sending out 
a Probe Request frame to an AP triggers the transmission of a proper Probe Response 
frame which contains information about the network managed by the AP.  Before an 
802.11 client can continue communication with an AP, it must first send an 
Authentication request.  Since, an 802.11 client can be authenticated to multiple APs it 
must also send an association request to determine which AP will be responsible for 
forwarding packets to the client.   Authentication Requests and Association Requests 
cause corresponding responses from the AP.  Probe Request, Authentication Request and 
Association Request flooding attacks can be executed by any malicious station in the area 
of a wireless network without being associated nor authenticated to the AP. [GIANLUI] 
 
4. Attack Demonstration and Current Industry Trends 
a. Attack Demonstration 
At the KEMA Control System Cyber Security Workshop held from 
August 16-18, 2004 in Idaho Falls, ID, the Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) staff demonstrated two control system attack 
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scenarios. The first was an attack from a PC located locally by a person with cyber 
security, but not control system knowledge.  The second attack utilized a recently 
identified system vulnerability to attack a typical substation SCADA system and was 
initiated remotely by Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) personnel from Albuquerque. 
The remote computer was connected to the local corporate LAN via a VPN connection.  
The attack was directed at a simulated  substation SCADA system at INEEL 
(approximately 800 miles away)..  The exploit was sent through the VPN connection 
from the corporate LAN to the SCADA LAN, and then through the firewall protecting 
the substation SCADA system.  The attackers were able to perform the following 
functions: 
• Open a breaker at the substation  
• Open and close all breakers at the substation  
• Change the SCADA Human Machine Interface breaker status 
representation on the operator's console display to indicate that a 
breaker was open while in reality it was not  
• Open a breaker at the substation while completely hiding the actual 
status of the breaker from the operator's displays. 
 
b. Industry Trends 
Microsoft gave a presentation at the above mentioned conference that 
included discussion on security improvements with Windows XP Service Pack 2.  These 
services include improved security in e-mail, Instant Messaging, and web services.  
When it was pointed out that good business practice would preclude the use of those 
services in control system applications, Microsoft said that the it was being pressed to 
include them by control system vendor customers.  The customers even advocated adding 
services such as Real Player.  The control system community of users and vendors needs 
to speak with one voice about the requirements for availability of these services in the 
control room environment in order to get the control system cyber security threat under  
27 
control.  While some of the control system vendors are recommending that installing 
Service Pack 2 should be avoided, Microsoft expressed concern and disagreed with this 
position. 
A review of web sites and conference exhibits show that many of the 
control system vendors are offering products with direct Internet connections to SCADA 
systems, RTUs, IEDs, transformers, etc. with no consideration given to the impacts on 
the cyber security of these systems and devices.   
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined some of the possible information assurance threats and 
vulnerabilities to a SCADA system.   A definition of vulnerability assessment was given 
along with the background information that contributed to the development of the 
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IV. DEVELOPING AND VALIDATING A VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT FOR SCADA SYSTEMS 
In order to develop a preliminary vulnerability assessment, this study looked at 
current approaches, developed a checklist of items to consider, crafted a vulnerability 
assessment checklist to be used in a case study, and performed the case study to validate 
the checklist.  These activities are detailed below.  The section concludes with lessons 
learned and recommendations.   
 
A. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE 
1. Methodology 
The approach taken was that outlined for a risk assessment in the DoN CIP Self 
Assessment Tool and Reference Guide [DONCIP].  This guide includes provisions for 
identifying critical assets and performing vulnerability assessments.  The guide provided 
a draft NIST self-assessment guide for Information Technology Systems that was 
designed to allow security managers and system administrators to audit their security 
policies and procedures.[NIST 800] 
The NIST self-assessment guide utilizes an extensive questionnaire containing 
specific control objectives against which a system or group of interconnected systems can 
be tested and measured. It does not establish new security requirements. The control 
objectives are abstracted directly from long-standing requirements found in statute, 
policy, and guidance on security and privacy.  The guide’s questionnaire was an excellent 
starting point that provided most of the material needed to conduct the assessment once 
viewed from a control system context. This questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. 
Questions from the NIST guide are separated into three major control areas: 1) 
management controls, 2) operational controls, and 3) technical controls.  The guide uses 
the Federal Information Technology Security Assessment Framework (Framework) that  
identifies five levels of IT security program effectiveness five measures to determine 
whether the security control is being implemented: 
• Level 1 – control objective documented in a security policy  
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• Level 2 – security controls documented as procedures  
• Level 3 – security relevant procedures have been implemented  
• Level 4 – security relevant procedures and security controls are tested and 
reviewed  
• Level 5 – security relevant procedures and security controls are fully 
integrated into a comprehensive program.  
For additional information on the Federal Information Technology Security 
Assessment Framework, refer to NIST SP 800-26 for details on what conditions have to 
be met in order to satisfy each of the levels. 
 
B. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF AGENCY X 
1. Initial Check List 
 An effective protection system for process control protects all of the 
critical functions of the system and their interfaces.  The items listed below were 
considered in building the initial checklist but should not be deemed as all encompassing: 
• Communications 
1. How are the remote acquisitioning units communicating to the master 
station? 
2. Are the communication channels protected, for example with 
encryption, and is redundancy built into the overall SCADA system? 
3. What protocols are being used and what are their vulnerabilities? 
• Commercial hardware and software and firmware 
1. What operating system is the hardware running? 
2. Has the operating system been hardened and unnecessary services 
disabled? 
3. Is there a password policy and is it being enforced? 
• Application software 
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1. Isconfiguration control implemented for application software? 
2. Is the application software from a trusted source and is it adequately  
tested?  
• Parameter data 
1. Are key parameter data files set to “Read only?” 
2. Is authentication required to write to data files? 
• Support infrastructure 
1.  Does the system have backup power? 
2. What are the environmental controls? 
   
If one of the above listed functions is not protected, the adversary could 
exploit it to use the process control system to cause an undesired event.  If not 
properly safeguarded, the adversary would not require physical access to trigger the 
event. [ NIJ ] 
A determination needs to be made as to access to the process control  system 
and should include: 
• List of authorized users 
• Means and routes of access to the system 
• Protection features of the system and their utilization 
1. Passwords 
2. Physical access control 
 
The presence of the items listed below represents some of the things to look 
for when conducting a vulnerability assessment since they can improve the protection 
of process control networks are: 
• Protected and strong passwords and password policies 
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1. Is there a password policy and is it being enforced? 
2. Do all users have administrative privileges? 
3. Are passwords shared? 
4. Do the passwords expire, etc? 
• Firewalls 
1. Are required firewalls in place; if not why not? 
2. Is there a firewall policy? 
3. How are the firewalls configured 
4. How are they maintained, etc.? 
• Configuration Control 
1. Is configuration management practiced? 
2. Is there a formal procedure for configuration management?  
• Is virus protection installed and up-to-date? 
• Are encryption and authentication appropriate? 
• In terms of redundant communication, are there any single points of 
failure in the system?  
• Is the process control network isolated from the external network? 
• Are process control sensors routed to alarm control center? 
 
C. LESSONS LEARNED FROM CASE STUDY 
When conducting the assessment of Agency X’s SCADA system, it was noted 
that not enough emphasis is placed on physical security since the technical controls 
normally employed in traditional IT systems are often not used.  Initially, the NIST 
questionnaire was used in conjunction with some additional references for firewall, 
router, remote access, and wireless network policies.  It was quickly determined that the 
NIST questionnaire did not going to be a perfect fit the for the SCADA system 
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vulnerability assessment checklist mainly due to what the ISA refers to as special 
considerations.  The NIST questionnaire did, however, with slight modification 
adequately address the common vulnerabilities found in SCADA systems as outlined by 
Sandia, ISA, CIDX, INEEL, and NERC. 
SCADA systems are complex and are all slightly different.  Not realizing these 
differences caused the assessor to make some assumptions that were incorrect.  The NIST 
questionnaire assumes the presence of a security policy and so did the assessor.  No 
written policies or even network diagrams were in place.  The assessor should have 
allowed more time for Agency X to review the questionnaire prior to the assessment and 
capture on paper some of the undocumented policies that it was following.  That could 
have provided a more accurate picture of their security posture. 
 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DON PRELIMINARY SCADA VA 
CHECKLIST 
NIST SP 800-26 provided an excellent framework for conducting a vulnerability 
assessment because of its comprehensiveness.  To apply the NIST checklist to a DoN 
SCADA vulnerability assessment, it was necessary to remove some of the checklist items 
and redefine some others as they relate to SCADA.   Appendix B captures lessons learned 
from the case study and extensive research.  Items from the NIST checklist have been 
removed, modified, or recommended for further consideration. The rationales for the 
changes from the NIST checklist that have been incorporated in Appendix B are 
discussed below. 
 
Since oftentimes many of the traditional IT security mechanisms are ignored in 
the SCADA environment, it may be necessary to place emphasis on Section 7 of the 
NIST checklist, Physical and Environmental Protection during an assessment.  .  
It is recommended that the following items be considered for further study and 
refinement.  However, until then, they could be deleted from the NIST checklist 
1. NIST currently has a proposal to write a SCADA protection profile that 
will identify security requirements for SCADA systems.  This research located no other 
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guidelines or policy for SCADA security requirements or controls.  Until a set of security 
requirements or controls is identified, Section 3, Life Cycle,  items  in  section  3.1  could 
be  removed.  When requirements are complete, Section 3.1 items will have more 
relevance.   
2. Section 11, Data Integrity, until a requirement is levied on SCADA system 
manufacturers to provide a method for ascertaining data integrity, it is useless to assess 
sub-items in section 11.2.  The most that one can expect in today’s SCADA systems is a 
check to ensure that the traffic is in the proper format according to the protocol and not 
whether it is legitimate. [PETERS]  Recommend leaving item 11.2 in the checklist and 
deleting the sub-items.  
3. Section 16.3 can be removed since public access to the SCADA system is 
not allowed. 
The following are items that needed some redefining. 
1. Section 10, Hardware and System Software Maintenance, item 10.3.2.  
This item asks if software patches are promptly installed.  SCADA environments 
normally do not abide by this rule.  Patches applied to SCADA systems must be tested 
thoroughly since these systems often run continuously.  They can ill afford the 
unintended effects that adding a patch may have on system operation and are often not 
applied at all.  Determining if there is a policy in place for the testing of software and 
firmware patches and how well they follow the policy is the most that can be expected 
from SCADA system owners. [ISA] 
2. Sections 15 – 17 fall broadly under the NIST heading of Technical 
Controls.  Today’s SCADA systems would fail when assessed against the criteria 
outlined in these three sections.  ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 has devoted section 6.5 to 
“Special Considerations for Manufacturing and Control Systems.  It outlines some of the 
critical operational differences between those systems and traditional IT systems that 
mandate how some security measures should be applied. [ISA] 
3. Section 15, Identification and Authentication.  According to the ISA, 
certain emergency actions should not be hampered by passwords.  This violates both 
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critical elements of section 15 of the NIST checklist.  Passwords do have their place in a 
SCADA environment, i.e., access to perform system configuration, and their use should 
not be totally discounted, as was observed in this case study.  It is suggested that the 
section is left as is and tailored for the specific SCADA system application.    
4. Section 16, Logical Access Controls.  At the core of logical access control 
mechanisms is the ability to identify and authenticate users.  The way passwords are 
utilized and not utilized in the SCADA environment hampers this effort.  This section 
should be left in since agencies such as NIST recognize the need for access control and 
are working to build a protection profile for a SCADA that will have mechanisms in 
place to address this issue.  Item 16.2.11 discusses firewalls and their compliance with 
firewall policy and rules.  Refer to the Navy Marine Corps Unclassified Trusted Network 
Protect Policy, if applicable, or  to the NIST SP 800-41, Guidelines on Firewalls and 
Firewall Policy, to ensure compliance with this objective.  Many objectives contained in 
section 16 can be met today. [PETERS] 
5. Section 17, Audit Trail, present most of the same issues noted with 
Sections 15 and 16.  Poor password policy precludes an effective auditing program.  
Again, however, in cases where possible, auditing can be effective if practiced. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the possible information assurance threats and 
vulnerabilities to a SCADA system.  There are indicators to look for when doing an 
assessment that, if in place, enhances the systems security This chapter discussed the 
methodology employed to perform the assessment of the SCADA system.  It also gave 
some solutions to mitigate some of the vulnerabilities found during the assessment.  From 
the extensive research and lessons learned from conducting the case study of Agency X, a 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis sought to produce a preliminary vulnerability checklist for use by the 
DoN in assessing its SCADA systems.  While it is noted that all SCADA systems are 
likely to be in a different configuration, the major components and vulnerabilities remain 
the same.  The following are some recommendations and conclusions found during the 
course of this study. 
 
1. Expand the SCADA Laboratory 
Initially, the validation of my research was going to be performed in the SCADA 
laboratory.  Time and roadblocks prevented the completion of the SCADA laboratory.   
The addition of more components to the laboratory will more accurately simulate a real 
process control network. Then it will be useful for vulnerability assessment exercises.  
Additionally, real penetration testing can be conducted in the laboratory since it won’t be 
a part of a live network. 
 
2. Incorporate SCADA Systems into the DITSCAP Process 
All research pointed to the fact that, while recognized as computer-based  IT 
systems, SCADA systems were not incorporated into the DITSCAP process.  Industry 
trends are moving toward the incorporation of more open standards and the reliance upon 
the Internet for SCADA system maintenance and reporting.  SCADA components such as 
RTUs and IEDs are being designed and built today with capability to connect to the 
Internet.  These connection points must be secured even if not actively connected to 
prevent someone with access from maliciously or accidentally establishing a connection.  
Although it may not be part of the network diagram, if the connection point is there, the 
possibility for its use exists and should therefore be acknowledged and carefully 
monitored through the use of a structured C & A process such as the DITSCAP. 
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3. Future Work 
During this research, an interesting new technology was identified that warrants 
some additional attention.  The technology claims that it can solve the problems that exist 
in today’s IP networks, without replacing them, and provide SCADA system 
communication with reliable, deterministic performance by the network.  The Emergency 
Telecommunications Services (ETS) has a draft technical report out that lists its 
requirements for network reliability and the technology in Figure 6 claims to meet them 
all [ETS].  The requirements set forth by ETS in the technical report are that the 
communication be: 
 
• Connection-oriented – each communication of critical data happens in a 
registered session over a virtual circuit, i.e., for the duration of a given 
session, traffic is sent over a pre-planned route or routes with characteristics 
known by a stateful management process; 
• Stateful – network management uses an automated process to gather and 
maintain link characteristics used to plan virtual circuit routes with sufficient 
regularity to control and respond to events of a given duration. For example, 
for a voice call, events of interest have durations on the order of tens of 
milliseconds (10-2 sec). State information granularity must, therefore, be of the 
order of milliseconds (10-3 sec) or less. 
• Controlled Out-of-band – the network must prevent user access to signaling 
and control traffic. This problem occurred in the public telephone system 
some decades ago and was solved by separating the control traffic from the 
voice traffic. A separate control network was overlaid onto the voice network 
to which users had no ready access. Although the other architectural traits 
have an impact on security, this characteristic is critical to reducing the 
vulnerability of IP Networks. 
• Coherent, distributed Control – traffic over IP Networks is usually hauled by 
more than one Carrier. In order to have end-to-end control of the traffic, the 
control network needs the same ubiquitous coverage. This control should be 
physically distributed to prevent having a single point of failure, but 
coherency is required to provide an end-to-end stateful view of the overall 
network. This facet also has significant impact on network vulnerability, 
especially in certain distributed attack scenarios. 
This architecture comprises a so-called “Cognitive” Network that provides: 
• Bandwidth management and guaranteed network performance, end to end; 
• A means to monitor usage patterns to detect and counter attacks; 
• A means to monitor and enforce communications Service Level 
Agreements; 
• Superior privacy and network security; 
• Significantly lower operating expenses with modest capital investment; 
and 
• A backward-compatible, yet future-proof, solution to the fundamental 














Research to ascertain its merit in securing SCADA communications from cyber 
attacks would be of benefit since the technology claims to be impervious to DOS, DDOS, 
masquerade, man-in-the-middle, and firewall attacks. 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to produce a preliminary vulnerability checklist and lay the 
foundation for the creation of a more comprehensive checklist for vulnerability 
assessments of DoN SCADA systems to be used by DoN Assessment teams.  A checklist  
was created and validated in a representative commercial dependency environment 
representative of what the DoN uses.  More work needs to be done in encouraging 
commercial entities to treat seriously the threat posed by cyber attacks to process control 
networks.  Moreover, the DoN also needs to examine its own process control networks in 
order to ascertain and mitigate that threat as well. 
There exists a large chasm between the administration of corporate networks and 
SCADA system networks that needs to be bridged.  For example, simple industry best 
practices such as password security are ignored in favor of trust for fear of  self-inflicted 
denial of service attacks.  There is also a need for a closer relationship between the 
corporate IT security personnel and the process control network administrators.  
Corporate IP security personnel have a better appreciation for cyber security since they 
have been concerned with it for at much greater period of time. 
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System Name, Title, and Unique Identifier:  _____________________________________ 
 
Major Application ____________________         or       General Support 
System  __________________ 
 
 









Date of Evaluation:  _________________________   
 
 
List of Connected Systems: 
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Management controls focus on the management of the IT security system and the 
management of risk for a system. They are techniques and concerns that are normally 
addressed by management. 
 
1. Risk Management 
 
Risk is the possibility of something adverse happening. Risk management is the process of 
assessing risk, taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level, and maintaining that level of 
risk.  The following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels 
for each of these critical elements should be determined based on the answers to the 
























































        







NIST SP 800-18 
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1.1.3  Has data 
sensitivity and 




        
1.1.4  Have 
threat sources, 
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weaknesses that 
could be 
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2. REVIEW OF SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
Routine evaluations and response to identified vulnerabilities are important elements of 
managing the risk of a system.  The following questions are organized according to two 
critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined based 
































        









        
2.1 1  Has the 








        











































        
2.1.4  Are tests 
and 
examinations 












        











        










        
2.2.1  Is there 
an effective 







































3. LIFE CYCLE 
 
Like other aspects of an IT system, security is best managed if planned for 
throughout the IT system life cycle.  There are many models for the IT system life cycle 
but most contain five basic phases: initiation, development/acquisition, implementation, 
operation, and disposal. The following questions are organized according to two critical 
elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined based on 























OMB Circular A-130, III 
FISCAM CC-1.1 
        
3.1.  Critical Element: 
Has a system 
development life cycle 
methodology been 
developed? 
        
Initiation Phase 
 
        
3.1.1  Is the sensitivity of 
the system determined? 
OMB Circular A-130, III 
FISCAM AC-1.1 & 1.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.1.2  Does the business 
case document the 
resources required for 
adequately securing the 
system? 
Clinger-Cohen 
        
3.1.3  Does the 
Investment Review 
Board ensure any 
investment request 
includes the security 
resources needed? 
 Clinger-Cohen 
        





FISCAM CC –1.2 





















3.1.5  Does the budget 
request include the 
security resources 
required for the system? 
GISRA 




        
3.1.6  During the system 
design, are security 
requirements identified?   
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.1.7  Was an initial risk 
assessment performed to 
determine security 
requirements? 
NIST SP 800-30 
        
3.1.8  Is there a written 
agreement with program 
officials on the security 
controls employed and 
residual risk? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.1.9  Are security 
controls consistent with 
and an integral part of the 
IT architecture of the 
agency? 
OMB Circular A-130, 
8B3 
        
3.1.10  Are the 
appropriate security 
controls with associated 
evaluation and test 
procedures developed 
before the procurement 
action? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.1.11 Do the solicitation 
documents (e.g., Request 
for Proposals) include 
security requirements and 
evaluation/test 
procedures? 
NIST SP 800-18 





















3.1.12  Do the 
requirements in the 
solicitation documents 
permit updating security 
controls as new 
threats/vulnerabilities are 
identified and as new 
technologies are 
implemented? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
Implementation Phase 
 
        
3.2.  Critical Element: 
Are changes controlled 
as programs progress 
through testing to final 
approval? 
        
3.2.1  Are design reviews 
and system tests run prior 
to placing the system in 
production?  
FISCAM CC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.2  Are the test results 
documented? 
FISCAM CC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.3   Is certification 
testing of security 
controls conducted and 
documented? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.4  If security controls 
were added since 
development, has the 
system documentation 
been modified to include 
them? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.5  If security controls 
were added since 
development, have the 
security controls been 
tested and the system 
recertified? 
FISCAM CC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 





















3.2.6  Has the application 
undergone a technical 
evaluation to ensure that 
it meets applicable 
federal laws, regulations, 
policies, guidelines, and 
standards? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.7  Does the system 
have written 
authorization to operate 
either on an interim basis 
with planned corrective 
action or full 
authorization? 
NIST SP 800-18 




        
3.2.8  Has a system 
security plan been 
developed and approved? 
OMB Circular A-130, III 
FISCAM SP 2-1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.9 If the system 
connects to other 
systems, have controls 
been established and 
disseminated to the 
owners of the 
interconnected systems? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.10  Is the system 
security plan kept 
current? 
OMB Circular A-130, III 
FISCAM SP 2-1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
Disposal Phase 
 
        




NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.12  Is information or 
media purged, overwritten, 
degaussed, or destroyed when 
disposed or used elsewhere? 
FISCAM AC-3.4 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.13 Is a record kept of 
who implemented the 





















disposal actions and 
verified that the 
information or media was 
sanitized? 




4. AUTHORIZE PROCESSING (CERTIFICATION & ACCREDITATION) 
 
Authorize processing (Note: Some agencies refer to this process as certification 
and accreditation) provides a form of assurance of the security of the system. The 
following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each 































        
4.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Has the system 
been 
certified/recertified 
and authorized to 
process 
(accredited)? 
        
4.1.1  Has a 
technical and/or 
security evaluation 
been completed or 
conducted when a 
significant change 
occurred?  
NIST SP 800-18  
        
4.1.2  Has a risk 
assessment been 
conducted when a 
significant change 
occurred? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
4.1.3  Have Rules of 
Behavior been 
established and 
signed by users? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
4.1.4  Has a 
contingency plan 
been developed and 
tested? 
NIST SP 800-18 






















4.1.5  Has a system 
security plan been 
developed, updated, 
and reviewed? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
4.1.6  Are in-place 
controls operating 
as intended? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
4.1.7  Are the 
planned and in-
place controls 
consistent with the 
identified risks and 
the system and data 
sensitivity? 
NIST SP 800-18 







owned and operated 





        
4.2.  Critical 
Element: 
Is the system 
operating on an 
interim authority 




        
4.2.1  Has 
management 
initiated prompt 
action to correct 
deficiencies? 
NIST SP 800-18 




5. SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN 
 
System security plans provide an overview of the security requirements of the system and 
describe the controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.  The plan delineates 
responsibilities and expected behavior of all individuals who access the system. The 
following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of 


































        
5.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is a system 
security plan 
documented 
for the system 
and all 
interconnected 




        
5.1.1  Is the 
system security 
plan approved 







        

































5.1.3  Is a 










        
5.2.  Critical 
Element: 
Is the plan 
kept current? 
   
 
    
5.2.1  Is the 
plan reviewed 
periodically 














The operational controls address security methods focusing on mechanisms primarily 
implemented and executed by people (as opposed to systems).  These controls are put in 
place to improve the security of a particular system (or group of systems).  They often require 
technical or specialized expertise and often rely upon management activities as well as 
technical controls. 
 
6. PERSONNEL SECURITY 
 
Many important issues in computer security involve human users, designers, implementers, 
and managers.  A broad range of security issues relates to how these individuals interact with 
computers and the access and authorities they need to do their jobs. The following questions 
are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical 



























        








        







NIST SP 800-18 
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6.2.4  Are there 
conditions for 
allowing system 
access prior to 
































7. PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
 
Physical security and environmental security are the measures taken to protect systems, 
buildings, and related supporting infrastructures against threats associated with their physical 
environment. The following questions are organized according to three critical elements.  The 

































        













        
7.1.1  Is access 
to facilities 
controlled 
through the use 
of guards, 
identification 
badges, or entry 
devices such as 





        
7.1.2  Does 
management 
regularly 
review the list 
of persons with 
physical access 



























7.1.3  Are 
deposits and 
withdrawals of 
tapes and other 
storage media 





        
7.1.4  Are keys 
or other access 
devices needed 






        
7.1.5  Are unused 




        








enter after fire 
drills, etc?  
FISCAM AC-
3.1 
        
7.1.7  Are 
visitors to 
sensitive areas 




        









































        








        


















        











        
7.1.13  Are fire 
ignition sources, 
such as failures of 
electronic devices 


































        








        






        














        
7.1.17  Are 
building 
plumbing lines 







        













































        





        








        













        






        
7.3.1  Are 
sensitive data 
files encrypted 
on all portable 
systems? 



































8. PRODUCTION, INPUT/OUTPUT CONTROLS 
 
There are many aspects to supporting IT operations. Topics range from a user help desk to 
procedures for storing, handling and destroying media. The following questions are organized 
according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be 





























        
8.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is there user 
support? 
        
8.1.1  Is there 





        





        
8.2.1  Are 
there processes 




copy, alter, or 





        













































        









        






        








        







        







        






































 NIST SP 800-
18 





9. CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
 
Contingency planning involves more than planning for a move offsite after a disaster 
destroys a facility. It also addresses how to keep an organization’s critical functions operating 
in the event of disruptions, large and small. The following questions are organized according 
to three critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined 



























        
9.1.  Critical 
Element:  
Have the most 
critical and sensitive 




        
9.1.1  Are critical 
data files and 
operations identified 
and the frequency of 
file backup 
documented? 
FISCAM SC- SC-1.1 
& 3.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        




        
9.1.3  Have 
processing priorities 




        
9.2.  Critical 




been developed and 
documented? 
        
9.2.1  Is the plan 
approved by key 
affected parties? 



























        





        
9.2.4  Is there an 
alternate processing 
site; if so, is there a 
contract or 
interagency 
agreement in place? 
 FISCAM SC-3.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
9.2.5  Is the location 
of stored backups 
identified? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
9.2.6 Are backup 
files created on a 
prescribed basis and 
rotated off-site often 
enough to avoid 
disruption if current 
files are damaged? 
FISCAM SC-2.1 
        
9.2.7  Is system and 
application 
documentation 
maintained at the off-
site location? 
FISCAM SC-2.1 
        
9.2.8  Are all system 
defaults reset after 
being restored from a 
backup? 
FISCAM SC-3.1 
        
9.2.9  Are the backup 
storage site and 
alternate site 
geographically 
removed from the 
primary site and 
physically protected? 
FISCAM SC-2.1 
        
9.2.10  Has the 
contingency plan 
been distributed to all 
appropriate 




























recovery plans in 
place?  
        
9.3.1  Is an up-to-




        
9.3.2  Are employees 
trained in their roles and 
responsibilities? 
FISCAM SC-2.3 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
9.3.3  Is the plan 
periodically tested 
and readjusted as 
appropriate? 
FISCAM SC-3.1 
NIST SP 800-18 





10. HARDWARE AND SYSTEM SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE 
 
These are controls used to monitor the installation of, and updates to, hardware and software 
to ensure that the system functions as expected and that a historical record is maintained of 
changes. Some of these controls are also covered in the Life Cycle Section. The following 
questions are organized according to three critical elements.  The levels for each of these 





























        
10.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is access limited 
to system software 
and hardware?  
        
10.1.1  Are 
restrictions in place 






NIST SP 800-18  
        




FISCAM CC-3.2 & 
3.3 
        
10.1.3  Are there 








from the site)? 
NIST SP 800-18 
































        
10.1.5  Are up-to-date 
procedures in place for 
using and monitoring 
use of system utilities? 
FISCAM SS-2.1 
        
10.2.  Critical 
Element: 







        
10.2.1  Is an impact 
analysis conducted 
to determine the 
effect of proposed 







NIST SP 800-18 
        







to promotion to 
production? 
FISCAM SS-3.1, 
3.2, & CC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 






















10.2.3  Are 
software change 
request forms used 
to document 
requests and related 
approvals? 
FISCAM CC-1.2  
NIST SP 800-18 
        







        
10.2.5  Is the type 
of test data to be 
used specified, i.e., 
live or made up? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
10.2.6  Are default 
settings of security 






        




date provided to all 
locations? 
FISCAM CC-2.3 
        
10.2.8  Is there 
version control? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        




        
10.2.10  Are the 
distribution and 
implementation of 

































prior to the change 
or after the fact? 
FISCAM CC-2.2 
        





updated to reflect 
system changes? 
FISCAM SC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        







NIST SP 800-18 
        




        
10.3.1  Are systems 
periodically 
reviewed to 
identify and, when 
possible, eliminate 
unnecessary 
services (e.g., FTP, 
HTTP, mainframe 
supervisor calls)? 
NIST SP 800-18 





























NIST SP 800-18 





11. DATA INTEGRITY 
 
Data integrity controls are used to protect data from accidental or malicious alteration or 
destruction and to provide assurance to the user the information meets expectations about its 
quality and integrity. The following questions are organized according to two critical 
elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined based on the 









































        







        

















has not been 
altered and 
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11.2.5  Are 
intrusion 
detection 









































        








logs in real 







 NIST SP 
800-18 
        




the system?  
NIST SP 800-
18 
        














The documentation contains descriptions of the hardware, software, policies, standards, 
procedures, and approvals related to the system and formalize the system’s security controls. 
When answering whether there are procedures for each control objective, the question should 
be phrased “are there procedures for ensuring the documentation is obtained and 
maintained.” The following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  The 



























        
12.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is there sufficient 
documentation 
that explains how 
software/hardware 
is to be used? 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.4  Are there 
network diagrams 
and documentation 
on setups of routers 
and switches? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.5  Are there 
software and 

























NIST SP 800-18 
12.1.6  Are there 
standard operating 
procedures for all the 
topic areas covered in 
this document? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.7  Are there 
user manuals? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.8  Are there 
emergency 
procedures? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.9  Are there 
backup procedures? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.  Critical 
Element: 





        






NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.2  Is there a 
contingency plan? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.3  Are there 
written agreements 
regarding how data 
is shared between 
interconnected 
systems? 
OMB A-130, III 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.4  Are there 
risk assessment 
reports? 
 NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.5  Are there 
certification and 
accreditation 
documents and a 
























system to process? 




13. SECURITY AWARENESS, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION 
 
People are a crucial factor in ensuring the security of computer systems and valuable 
information resources.  Security awareness, training, and education enhance security by 
improving awareness of the need to protect system resources. Additionally, training develops 
skills and knowledge so computer users can perform their jobs more securely and build in-
depth knowledge. The following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  
The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined based on the answers to 































        









        
13.1.1  Have 
employees 
received a copy 
of the Rules of 
Behavior? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        








        






        
13.1.4  Are 
methods 
employed to 




























NIST SP 800-18 
13.1.5  Have 
employees 
received a copy 
of or have easy 




NIST SP 800-18 





14. INCIDENT RESPONSE CAPABILITY 
 
Computer security incidents are an adverse event in a computer system or network. Such 
incidents are becoming more common and their impact far-reaching. The following questions 
are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical 































        
14.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is there a 
capability to 
provide help to 
users when a 
security 
incident occurs 
in the system? 
        






NIST SP 800-18 
        
14.1.2  Is there 




NIST SP 800-18 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        







NIST SP 800-18 



























NIST SP 800-18 
        
14.1.6  Is there a 




after an incident 
occurs? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        








        










OMB A-130, III 
NIST SP 800-18 
        









and threats?  
OMB A-130, III 
GISRA 
        




        
                                                 
2 FedCIRC (Federal Computer Incident Response Capability) is the U.S. Government’s focal point for 




































Technical controls focus on security controls that the computer system executes.  The 
controls can provide automated protection for unauthorized access or misuse, facilitate 
detection of security violations, and support security requirements for applications and data.  
 
 
15. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 
 
Identification and authentication is a technical measure that prevents unauthorized people (or 
unauthorized processes) from entering an IT system.  Access control usually requires that the 
system be able to identify and differentiate among users. The following questions are 
organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements 





























NIST SP 800-18 
        





        
                                                 
3 NIPC's mission is to serve as the U.S. Government's focal point for threat assessment, warning, 























tokens, or other 
devices? 





and their access? 
FISCAM AC-2 
NIST SP 800-18  
        
15.1.2  Are digital 
signatures used 
and conform to 
FIPS 186-2? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.4  Is emergency 
and temporary access 
authorized? 
FISCAM AC-2.2 
        
15.1.5  Are 
personnel files 









        
15.1.6  Are 
passwords 
changed at least 
every ninety days 
or earlier if 
needed? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.7  Are 
passwords unique 
and difficult to 





























NIST SP 800-18 
15.1.8  Are 
inactive user 
identifications 




NIST SP 800-18 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.10  Are there 
procedures in 





NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.11  Are 
passwords 
distributed 
securely and users 





NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.12  Are 
passwords 
transmitted and 
stored using secure 
protocols/algorithms? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        






NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.14  Is there a 
limit to the 
number of invalid 
access attempts 
that may occur 






















for a given user? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 







        
15.2.1  Does the 
system correlate 
actions to users? 
OMB A-130, III 
FISCAM SD-2.1 
        














16. LOGICAL ACCESS CONTROLS 
 
Logical access controls are the system-based mechanisms used to designate who or what is to 
have access to a specific system resource and the type of transactions and functions that are 
permitted. The following questions are organized according to three critical elements.  The 





























NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Do the logical 
access controls 




        





NIST SP 800-18 
        








access to allow 
fraudulent activity 
without collusion?  
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        




























16.1.4  Do 
workstations 
disconnect or 
screen savers lock 
system after a 
specific period of 
inactivity? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 






















16.1.5  Are inactive 
users’ accounts 
monitored and 
removed when not 
needed? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        




to control access to 
specific 
information types 
or files?  
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.1.7  If 
encryption is used, 
does it meet federal 
standards? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.1.8  If 
encryption is used, 
are there 






NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.1.9  Is access 
restricted to files at 
the logical view or 
field? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
        




and are such events 
investigated? 
FISCAM AC-4 
        
16.2.  Critical 
Element: 
Are there logical 
controls over 
network access? 





























FISCAM AC-3.2  
        
16.2.2  Are 
insecure protocols 





































        
16.2.4  Are there 
controls that restrict 
remote access to 
the system? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        





        
16.2.6  Does the 
network connection 
automatically 
disconnect at the 
end of a session? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
        
16.2.7  Are trust 
relationships 







        
16.2.8  Is dial-in 
access monitored? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
        





 FISCAM AC-3.2 
        
16.2.10  Are 
firewalls or secure 
gateways installed? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.2.11  If firewalls 
are installed do 
they comply with 
firewall policy and 
rules? 






























        
16.2.13  Is an approved 
standardized log-on 
banner displayed on the 
system warning 
unauthorized users that 
they have accessed a 
U.S. Government 
system and can be 
punished? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 






        







        
16.3.  Critical 
Element: 
If the public 
accesses the 




integrity of the 
application and 
the confidence of 
the public?  
        
16.3.1  Is a privacy 
policy posted on 
the web site? 
OMB-99-18 





17. AUDIT TRAILS 
Audit trails maintain a record of system activity by system or application processes and by 
user activity.  In conjunction with appropriate tools and procedures, audit trails can provide 
individual accountability, a means to reconstruct events, detect intrusions, and identify 
problems. The following questions are organized under one critical element.  The levels for 

















































        
17.1.1  Does 
the audit trail 
provide a 




        
17.1.2  Can 










































        




retained for a 
period of 
time, and if 
so, is access 





        













        






        
17.1.7  Are 
automated 
tools used to 
review audit 
records in 





        

































17.1.9  Is 
keystroke 
monitoring 










APPENDIX B.  PRELIMINARY VULNERABILIY ASSESSMENT 




System Name, Title, and Unique Identifier:  _____________________________________ 
 
Major Application ____________________         or       General Support 
System  __________________ 
 
 









Date of Evaluation:  _________________________   
 
 
List of Connected Systems: 














Category of Sensitivity 
 





















Management controls focus on the management of the IT security system and the 
management of risk for a system. They are techniques and concerns that are normally 
addressed by management. 
 
1. RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
Risk is the possibility of something adverse happening. Risk management is the process of 
assessing risk, taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level, and maintaining that level of 
risk.  The following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels 
for each of these critical elements should be determined based on the answers to the 


































        







NIST SP 800-18 
        




a regular basis 





























1.1.3  Has data 
sensitivity and 




        
1.1.4  Have 
threat sources, 




        




system flaws, or 
weaknesses that 
could be 







        










NIST SP 800-30 
        










of risk?  
        
                                                 

































        




NIST SP 800-30 
        







NIST SP 800-30 







2. REVIEW OF SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
Routine evaluations and response to identified vulnerabilities are important elements of 
managing the risk of a system.  The following questions are organized according to two 
critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined based 
































        









        
2.1 1  Has the 








        











































        
2.1.4  Are tests 
and 
examinations 












        











        










        
2.2.1  Is there 
an effective 







































3. LIFE CYCLE 
 
Like other aspects of an IT system, security is best managed if planned for 
throughout the IT system life cycle.  There are many models for the IT system life cycle 
but most contain five basic phases: initiation, development/acquisition, implementation, 
operation, and disposal. The following questions are organized according to two critical 
elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined based on 























OMB Circular A-130, III 
FISCAM CC-1.1 
        
3.1.  Critical Element: 
Has a system 
development life cycle 
methodology been 
developed? 
        
Initiation Phase 
 
        




        
         
Implementation Phase 
 
        
3.2.  Critical Element: 
Are changes controlled 
as programs progress 
through testing to final 
approval? 
        
3.2.1  Are design reviews 
and system tests run prior 
to placing the system in 
production?  
FISCAM CC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.2  Are the test results 
documented? 
FISCAM CC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 





















3.2.3   Is certification 
testing of security 
controls conducted and 
documented? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.4  If security controls 
were added since 
development, has the 
system documentation 
been modified to include 
them? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.5  If security controls 
were added since 
development, have the 
security controls been 
tested and the system 
recertified? 
FISCAM CC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 





















3.2.6  Has the application 
undergone a technical 
evaluation to ensure that 
it meets applicable 
federal laws, regulations, 
policies, guidelines, and 
standards? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.7  Does the system 
have written 
authorization to operate 
either on an interim basis 
with planned corrective 
action or full 
authorization? 
NIST SP 800-18 




        
3.2.8  Has a system 
security plan been 
developed and approved? 
OMB Circular A-130, III 
FISCAM SP 2-1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.9 If the system 
connects to other 
systems, have controls 
been established and 
disseminated to the 
owners of the 
interconnected systems? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.10  Is the system 
security plan kept 
current? 
OMB Circular A-130, III 
FISCAM SP 2-1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
Disposal Phase 
 
        




NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.12  Is information or 
media purged, overwritten, 
degaussed, or destroyed when 
disposed or used elsewhere? 
FISCAM AC-3.4 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
3.2.13 Is a record kept of 
who implemented the 





















disposal actions and 
verified that the 
information or media was 
sanitized? 
NIST SP 800-18 
 
NOTES:   
113 
4. AUTHORIZE PROCESSING (CERTIFICATION & ACCREDITATION) 
 
Authorize processing (Note: Some agencies refer to this process as certification 
and accreditation) provides a form of assurance of the security of the system. The 
following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each 































        
4.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Has the system 
been 
certified/recertified 
and authorized to 
process 
(accredited)? 
        
4.1.1  Has a 
technical and/or 
security evaluation 
been completed or 
conducted when a 
significant change 
occurred?  
NIST SP 800-18  
        
4.1.2  Has a risk 
assessment been 
conducted when a 
significant change 
occurred? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
4.1.3  Have Rules of 
Behavior been 
established and 
signed by users? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
4.1.4  Has a 
contingency plan 
been developed and 
tested? 
NIST SP 800-18 






















4.1.5  Has a system 
security plan been 
developed, updated, 
and reviewed? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
4.1.6  Are in-place 
controls operating 
as intended? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
4.1.7  Are the 
planned and in-
place controls 
consistent with the 
identified risks and 
the system and data 
sensitivity? 
NIST SP 800-18 







owned and operated 





        
4.2.  Critical 
Element: 
Is the system 
operating on an 
interim authority 




        
4.2.1  Has 
management 
initiated prompt 
action to correct 
deficiencies? 
NIST SP 800-18 




5. SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN 
 
System security plans provide an overview of the security requirements of the system and 
describe the controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.  The plan delineates 
responsibilities and expected behavior of all individuals who access the system. The 
following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of 


































        
5.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is a system 
security plan 
documented 
for the system 
and all 
interconnected 




        
5.1.1  Is the 
system security 
plan approved 







        

































5.1.3  Is a 










        
5.2.  Critical 
Element: 
Is the plan 
kept current? 
   
 
    
5.2.1  Is the 
plan reviewed 
periodically 














The operational controls address security methods focusing on mechanisms primarily 
implemented and executed by people (as opposed to systems).  These controls are put in 
place to improve the security of a particular system (or group of systems).  They often require 
technical or specialized expertise and often rely upon management activities as well as 
technical controls. 
 
6. PERSONNEL SECURITY 
 
Many important issues in computer security involve human users, designers, implementers, 
and managers.  A broad range of security issues relates to how these individuals interact with 
computers and the access and authorities they need to do their jobs. The following questions 
are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical 



























        








        







NIST SP 800-18 
        











































NIST SP 800-18 
        








        










        











        






NIST SP 800-18 
        










































        



























        









        
6.2.4  Are there 
conditions for 
allowing system 
access prior to 
































7. PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
 
Physical security and environmental security are the measures taken to protect systems, 
buildings, and related supporting infrastructures against threats associated with their physical 
environment. The following questions are organized according to three critical elements.  The 

































        













        
7.1.1  Is access 
to facilities 
controlled 
through the use 
of guards, 
identification 
badges, or entry 
devices such as 





        
7.1.2  Does 
management 
regularly 
review the list 
of persons with 
physical access 



























7.1.3  Are 
deposits and 
withdrawals of 
tapes and other 
storage media 





        
7.1.4  Are keys 
or other access 
devices needed 






        
7.1.5  Are unused 




        








enter after fire 
drills, etc?  
FISCAM AC-
3.1 
        
7.1.7  Are 
visitors to 
sensitive areas 




        









































        








        


















        











        
7.1.13  Are fire 
ignition sources, 
such as failures of 
electronic devices 


































        








        






        














        
7.1.17  Are 
building 
plumbing lines 







        













































        





        








        













        






        
7.3.1  Are 
sensitive data 
files encrypted 
on all portable 
systems? 



































8. PRODUCTION, INPUT/OUTPUT CONTROLS 
 
There are many aspects to supporting IT operations. Topics range from a user help desk to 
procedures for storing, handling and destroying media. The following questions are organized 
according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be 





























        
8.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is there user 
support? 
        
8.1.1  Is there 





        





        
8.2.1  Are 
there processes 




copy, alter, or 





        













































        









        






        








        







        







        






































 NIST SP 800-
18 





9. CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
 
Contingency planning involves more than planning for a move offsite after a disaster 
destroys a facility. It also addresses how to keep an organization’s critical functions operating 
in the event of disruptions, large and small. The following questions are organized according 
to three critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined 



























        
9.1.  Critical 
Element:  
Have the most 
critical and sensitive 




        
9.1.1  Are critical 
data files and 
operations identified 
and the frequency of 
file backup 
documented? 
FISCAM SC- SC-1.1 
& 3.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        




        
9.1.3  Have 
processing priorities 




        
9.2.  Critical 




been developed and 
documented? 
        
9.2.1  Is the plan 
approved by key 
affected parties? 



























        





        
9.2.4  Is there an 
alternate processing 
site; if so, is there a 
contract or 
interagency 
agreement in place? 
 FISCAM SC-3.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
9.2.5  Is the location 
of stored backups 
identified? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
9.2.6 Are backup 
files created on a 
prescribed basis and 
rotated off-site often 
enough to avoid 
disruption if current 
files are damaged? 
FISCAM SC-2.1 
        
9.2.7  Is system and 
application 
documentation 
maintained at the off-
site location? 
FISCAM SC-2.1 
        
9.2.8  Are all system 
defaults reset after 
being restored from a 
backup? 
FISCAM SC-3.1 
        
9.2.9  Are the backup 
storage site and 
alternate site 
geographically 
removed from the 
primary site and 
physically protected? 
FISCAM SC-2.1 
        
9.2.10  Has the 
contingency plan 
been distributed to all 
appropriate 




























recovery plans in 
place?  
        
9.3.1  Is an up-to-




        
9.3.2  Are employees 
trained in their roles and 
responsibilities? 
FISCAM SC-2.3 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
9.3.3  Is the plan 
periodically tested 
and readjusted as 
appropriate? 
FISCAM SC-3.1 
NIST SP 800-18 





10. HARDWARE AND SYSTEM SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE 
 
These are controls used to monitor the installation of, and updates to, hardware and software 
to ensure that the system functions as expected and that a historical record is maintained of 
changes. Some of these controls are also covered in the Life Cycle Section. The following 
questions are organized according to three critical elements.  The levels for each of these 





























        
10.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is access limited 
to system software 
and hardware?  
        
10.1.1  Are 
restrictions in place 






NIST SP 800-18  
        




FISCAM CC-3.2 & 
3.3 
        
10.1.3  Are there 








from the site)? 
NIST SP 800-18 
































        
10.1.5  Are up-to-date 
procedures in place for 
using and monitoring 
use of system utilities? 
FISCAM SS-2.1 
        
10.2.  Critical 
Element: 







        
10.2.1  Is an impact 
analysis conducted 
to determine the 
effect of proposed 







NIST SP 800-18 
        







to promotion to 
production? 
FISCAM SS-3.1, 
3.2, & CC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 






















10.2.3  Are 
software change 
request forms used 
to document 
requests and related 
approvals? 
FISCAM CC-1.2  
NIST SP 800-18 
        







        
10.2.5  Is the type 
of test data to be 
used specified, i.e., 
live or made up? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
10.2.6  Are default 
settings of security 






        




date provided to all 
locations? 
FISCAM CC-2.3 
        
10.2.8  Is there 
version control? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        




        
10.2.10  Are the 
distribution and 
implementation of 

































prior to the change 
or after the fact? 
FISCAM CC-2.2 
        





updated to reflect 
system changes? 
FISCAM SC-2.1 
NIST SP 800-18 
        







NIST SP 800-18 
        




        
10.3.1  Are systems 
periodically 
reviewed to 
identify and, when 
possible, eliminate 
unnecessary 
services (e.g., FTP, 
HTTP, mainframe 
supervisor calls)? 
NIST SP 800-18 





























NIST SP 800-18 





11. DATA INTEGRITY 
 
Data integrity controls are used to protect data from accidental or malicious alteration or 
destruction and to provide assurance to the user the information meets expectations about its 
quality and integrity. The following questions are organized according to two critical 
elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined based on the 









































        







        

















has not been 
altered and 


































The documentation contains descriptions of the hardware, software, policies, standards, 
procedures, and approvals related to the system and formalize the system’s security controls. 
When answering whether there are procedures for each control objective, the question should 
be phrased “are there procedures for ensuring the documentation is obtained and 
maintained.” The following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  The 



























        
12.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is there sufficient 
documentation 
that explains how 
software/hardware 
is to be used? 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.4  Are there 
network diagrams 
and documentation 
on setups of routers 
and switches? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        



























NIST SP 800-18 
12.1.6  Are there 
standard operating 
procedures for all the 
topic areas covered in 
this document? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.7  Are there 
user manuals? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.8  Are there 
emergency 
procedures? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.1.9  Are there 
backup procedures? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.  Critical 
Element: 





        






NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.2  Is there a 
contingency plan? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.3  Are there 
written agreements 
regarding how data 
is shared between 
interconnected 
systems? 
OMB A-130, III 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.4  Are there 
risk assessment 
reports? 
 NIST SP 800-18 
        
12.2.5  Are there 
certification and 
accreditation 
documents and a 
statement 
authorizing the 






















system to process? 




13. SECURITY AWARENESS, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION 
 
People are a crucial factor in ensuring the security of computer systems and valuable 
information resources.  Security awareness, training, and education enhance security by 
improving awareness of the need to protect system resources. Additionally, training develops 
skills and knowledge so computer users can perform their jobs more securely and build in-
depth knowledge. The following questions are organized according to two critical elements.  
The levels for each of these critical elements should be determined based on the answers to 































        









        
13.1.1  Have 
employees 
received a copy 
of the Rules of 
Behavior? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        








        






        
13.1.4  Are 
methods 
employed to 




























NIST SP 800-18 
13.1.5  Have 
employees 
received a copy 
of or have easy 




NIST SP 800-18 





14. INCIDENT RESPONSE CAPABILITY 
 
Computer security incidents are an adverse event in a computer system or network. Such 
incidents are becoming more common and their impact far-reaching. The following questions 
are organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical 































        
14.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Is there a 
capability to 
provide help to 
users when a 
security 
incident occurs 
in the system? 
        






NIST SP 800-18 
        
14.1.2  Is there 




NIST SP 800-18 
        





NIST SP 800-18 
        







NIST SP 800-18 



























NIST SP 800-18 
        
14.1.6  Is there a 




after an incident 
occurs? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        








        










OMB A-130, III 
NIST SP 800-18 
        









and threats?  
OMB A-130, III 
GISRA 
        




        
                                                 
5 FedCIRC (Federal Computer Incident Response Capability) is the U.S. Government’s focal point for 

































                                                 
6 NIPC's mission is to serve as the U.S. Government's focal point for threat assessment, warning, 





Technical controls focus on security controls that the computer system executes.  The 
controls can provide automated protection for unauthorized access or misuse, facilitate 
detection of security violations, and support security requirements for applications and data.  
 
 
15. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 
 
Identification and authentication is a technical measure that prevents unauthorized people (or 
unauthorized processes) from entering an IT system.  Access control usually requires that the 
system be able to identify and differentiate among users. The following questions are 
organized according to two critical elements.  The levels for each of these critical elements 





























NIST SP 800-18 
        






tokens, or other 
devices? 
        





and their access? 
FISCAM AC-2 
NIST SP 800-18  
        
15.1.2  Are digital 
signatures used 
and conform to 
FIPS 186-2? 
NIST SP 800-18 



























NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.4  Is emergency 
and temporary access 
authorized? 
FISCAM AC-2.2 
        
15.1.5  Are 
personnel files 









        
15.1.6  Are 
passwords 
changed at least 
every ninety days 
or earlier if 
needed? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.7  Are 
passwords unique 
and difficult to 







NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.8  Are 
inactive user 
identifications 




NIST SP 800-18 
        



























NIST SP 800-18 
15.1.10  Are there 
procedures in 





NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.11  Are 
passwords 
distributed 
securely and users 





NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.12  Are 
passwords 
transmitted and 
stored using secure 
protocols/algorithms? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        






NIST SP 800-18 
        
15.1.14  Is there a 
limit to the 
number of invalid 
access attempts 
that may occur 
for a given user? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        







        
15.2.1  Does the 
system correlate 
actions to users? 
OMB A-130, III 
FISCAM SD-2.1 
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16. LOGICAL ACCESS CONTROLS 
 
Logical access controls are the system-based mechanisms used to designate who or what is to 
have access to a specific system resource and the type of transactions and functions that are 
permitted. The following questions are organized according to three critical elements.  The 





























NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.1.  Critical 
Element: 
Do the logical 
access controls 




        





NIST SP 800-18 
        








access to allow 
fraudulent activity 
without collusion?  
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        




























16.1.4  Do 
workstations 
disconnect or 
screen savers lock 
system after a 
specific period of 
inactivity? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 






















16.1.5  Are inactive 
users’ accounts 
monitored and 
removed when not 
needed? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        




to control access to 
specific 
information types 
or files?  
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.1.7  If 
encryption is used, 
does it meet federal 
standards? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.1.8  If 
encryption is used, 
are there 






NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.1.9  Is access 
restricted to files at 
the logical view or 
field? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
        




and are such events 
investigated? 
FISCAM AC-4 
        
16.2.  Critical 
Element: 
Are there logical 
controls over 
network access? 





























FISCAM AC-3.2  
        
16.2.2  Are 
insecure protocols 





































        
16.2.4  Are there 
controls that restrict 
remote access to 
the system? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        





        
16.2.6  Does the 
network connection 
automatically 
disconnect at the 
end of a session? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
        
16.2.7  Are trust 
relationships 







        
16.2.8  Is dial-in 
access monitored? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
        





 FISCAM AC-3.2 
        
16.2.10  Are 
firewalls or secure 
gateways installed? 
NIST SP 800-18 
        
16.2.11  If firewalls 
are installed do 
they comply with 
firewall policy and 
rules? 






























        
16.2.13  Is an approved 
standardized log-on 
banner displayed on the 
system warning 
unauthorized users that 
they have accessed a 
U.S. Government 
system and can be 
punished? 
FISCAM AC-3.2 
NIST SP 800-18 






        







        
16.3.  Critical 
Element: 
If the public 
accesses the 




integrity of the 
application and 
the confidence of 
the public?  
        
         
 




17. AUDIT TRAILS 
Audit trails maintain a record of system activity by system or application processes and by 
user activity.  In conjunction with appropriate tools and procedures, audit trails can provide 
individual accountability, a means to reconstruct events, detect intrusions, and identify 
problems. The following questions are organized under one critical element.  The levels for 

















































        
17.1.1  Does 
the audit trail 
provide a 




        
17.1.2  Can 










































        




retained for a 
period of 
time, and if 
so, is access 





        













        






        
17.1.7  Are 
automated 
tools used to 
review audit 
records in 





        

































17.1.9  Is 
keystroke 
monitoring 
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